We measure safety in terms of "Lost Time Incidents", but does that really tell us how safe our plants and processes are?

"An airline would not make the mistake of measuring air safety by looking at the number of routine injuries occurring to its staff."

Mr. Andrew Hopkins made the above statement in his book "Lessons from Longford", a study of the 1998 ESSO® gas plant explosion in Australia.

Lost Time Incident measurement fixates on injuries or "occupational illnesses" that cause a person to miss work. If someone falls off a ladder, the incident is diligently reported to OSHA who, in turn, diligently adds the report to their incident database. When you drive into a plant site, witness the proudly displayed sign claiming 256 days without a lost time incident. "Thanks team!"

What isn't advertised on a sign are process incidents that disrupt the control room and normal operations, yet never become publicly visible. These "near misses" arguably signify risk. They threaten the safety of the plant. Why then are they not monitored or measured?

Process alarms are a rich source of data about abnormal process conditions and process incidents. They are also a rich source of data about opportunities to improve the control room environment to enable operators to more successfully resolve or avoid abnormal conditions.

One portion of the approach to control room "optimization" includes HMI graphics and navigation, screen size and layout, seating - the physical aspects of the control room. There is another portion. Reduction of human error.

Industrial accident research shows that as high as 80% of those accidents involved human error. If you could objectively quantify, qualify, and rank the factors that contribute to human error, would you?

The benefits go beyond safety, as "incidents" can include off-spec product, scrap batches, and other quality factors.

Only through evaluation of all aspects of the operator environment can you completely address alarm management.